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Abstract
We analyze reinforcement learning under so-called “dynamic reinforcement”. In reinforce-
ment learning, each agent repeatedly interacts with an unknown environment (i.e., other agents),
receives a reward, and updates the probabilities of its next action based on its own previous ac-
tions and received rewards. Unlike standard reinforcement learning, dynamic reinforcement uses
a combination of long term rewards and recent rewards to construct myopically forward look-
ing action selection probabilities. We analyze the long term stability of the learning dynamics
for general games with pure strategy Nash equilibria and specialize the results for coordina-
tion games and distributed network formation. In this class of problems, more than one stable
equilibrium (i.e., coordination conﬁguration) may exist. We demonstrate equilibrium selection
under dynamic reinforcement. In particular, we show how a single agent is able to destabi-
lize an equilibrium in favor of another by appropriately adjusting its dynamic reinforcement
parameters. We contrast the conclusions with prior game theoretic results according to which
the risk dominant equilibrium is the only robust equilibrium when agents’ decisions are subject
to small randomized perturbations. The analysis throughout is based on the ODE method for
stochastic approximations, where a special form of perturbation in the learning dynamics allows
for analyzing its behavior at the boundary points of the state space.
1 Introduction
Agent-based approaches have generated signiﬁcant interest in various settings spanning engineering,
economics and social sciences, in which independent institutions or individuals interact with other
institutions or individuals in a distributed manner. Agents are not necessarily aware of the current
conditions of the environment they are interacting with (e.g., the actions or intentions of the other
agents are uncertain), and the eﬀect of their actions on the future behavior of their environment is
unknown.
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1We are interested in a class of problems that can be modeled as coordination problems. Co-
ordination is of interest in engineering, where multiagent applications deal with convergence to
coordination [1, 2, 3, 4], synchronization [5], swarming or formation control [6]; economics, where
various strategic interactions belong to the class of coordination games [7, 8, 9]; and, social networks,
where agents “coordinate”, through optimizing their own interests to achieve a global conﬁgura-
tion [10, 11]. In such problems, there might be multiple Nash equilibria, and these equilibria may
be distinguished by various payoﬀ characteristics, such as being payoﬀ-dominant or others risk-
dominant (cf., [9]). Our interest in this paper is to investigate convergence to eﬃcient coordination
in a distributed and adaptive fashion.
Coordination games have been extensively studied within the framework of several learning
dynamics. In the pioneering work of [8] and [7], convergence to the risk-dominant equilibrium is
shown when agents apply adaptive-play and best-reply dynamics, respectively, while at the same
time agents’ decisions are subject to small randomized perturbations (or mutations), which are
uniformly distributed across population. A more general result by [12] has shown that it is possible
to ﬁnd small mutation rates so that any long-run prediction is possible. However, these speciﬁcally
tailored perturbations are globally state dependent. A quite similar result to the dynamics of [8, 7]
is also obtained by the dynamics of [13], where agents at every point in time select strategies which
maximize their expected discounted payoﬀ, however their decisions are subject to a small friction,
i.e., agents make a commitment to a particular action in a short run. It was shown that the risk-
dominant equilibrium is the unique equilibrium that is selected in the long run when the friction is
suﬃciently small.
Another class of algorithms that has been used to predict behavior in coordination games is
aspiration learning algorithms [14, 15]. In these algorithms, agents base their decisions only on the
rewards received (payoﬀ-based algorithms). An agent continues playing an action as long as the
reward received is strictly greater than the agent’s aspiration level (average over all its previous
payoﬀs). In case an eﬃcient action proﬁle has not been played in the past, the learning algorithm
can get trapped in a non-eﬃcient action. To resolve this issue, several perturbed versions of this class
of learning algorithms have been introduced, including [14] and [15]. In [14] a small perturbation is
added in the update recursion of the aspiration level of each agent, while in [15] a small perturbation
is added to the each agent’s decision rule. Although the analysis is diﬀerent in those two models
([14] uses a stochastic stability argument, while [15] uses stochastic approximations), both conclude
that in a 2 player and 2 action coordination game the process converges to the eﬃcient coordination.
However, this is not necessarily the case in coordination games with a larger number of agents or
actions. Furthermore, prior work on aspiration learning in 2 player and 2 action coordination
games, e.g., [15], has shown that in some games, such as the Battle of the Sexes (cf., [16]), where
two symmetric pure Nash equilibria exist, convergence to either one of the Nash equilibria cannot
be favored via aspiration learning [15, Proposition 4.6].
2Aspiration learning does not model behavior where agents build their conﬁdence through both
rewards and repeated selection of the same action. This behavior can be modeled by reinforcement
learning. Each agent updates a probability distribution (or propensities) over available actions
and the probability of an action is reinforced proportionally to the reward. This class of dynamics
belongs to the general class of linear reward-inaction schemes and was considered ﬁrst in mathemat-
ical psychology by [17] and introduced in engineering by [18]. It has also been applied in diﬀerent
forms in evolutionary economics, for modeling human or economic behavior [19, 20, 21, 22, 23],
sociology, for modeling social network formation [24], and computer science, for learning how to
reach the payoﬀ-dominant equilibrium [25]. There is also discussion [20, 22, 23] on how this class of
dynamics is related to replicator dynamics [26]. In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to this
class of dynamics as reinforcement learning, and when necessary we will point out the diﬀerences
among diﬀerent models.
Under reinforcement learning, convergence to either payoﬀ-dominant (eﬃcient) or risk-dominant
coordination is not necessarily guaranteed, since stochastic events may give an initial advantage to
any coordination which will then be reinforced. Reinforcing convergence to the payoﬀ-dominant
equilibrium may be particularly problematic when payoﬀ and risk-dominant equilibria do not coin-
cide. Prior work in computer science has sought to answer this question by allowing communication
between players. For example, in [25], convergence to the eﬃcient outcome is attained if agents are
able to agree on restricting their action sets. Also, in [27], agents are allowed to communicate with
each other their understanding of the game structure.
Of course, there are several other forms of learning dynamics in the economics literature (sur-
veyed in [28, 29]) or computer science literature (such as Q-learning [30] or learning automata [31])
in which the focus is not necessarily on coordination problems.
In this paper, we are particularly interested in reinforcing the eﬃcient equilibrium using so-called
dynamic reinforcement. This form of learning dynamics is a modiﬁed version of reinforcement
learning. Unlike traditional reinforcement learning, agents make decisions according to a new
rule where recent changes in the propensities are taken into account along with older changes
(anecdotally, “trends” matter).
There have been various past works in both the game theory and engineering literature that
explored similar models. The paper [32], in response to the work of [33], considers a learning
dynamic for zero-sum games played over intervals, in which play over recent intervals are combined
to create an anticipatory forecast for a best response. Analysis of similar anticipatory ideas are
reported in [34] and [35], and experimental results are reported in [36]. Likewise, [37] investigates
a version of ﬁctitious play in which players emphasize recent play. In the engineering literature,
related ideas have been used as models of human decision making in the context of human/machine
interactions [38, 39] and of human motor skill control [40].
The particular decision rule considered herein is in the same spirit as the reinforcement scheme
3for convergence to mixed Nash equilibria in ﬁctitious play in [41]. By using this dynamic processing,
agents reinforce new trends in strategic directions, and this can alter the stability properties of
equilibria. We will show that dynamic reinforcement also can be viewed as an equilibrium selection
scheme, since agents—sometimes even a single agent—may be able to destabilize the non-eﬃcient
equilibria by appropriately adjusting the details of its dynamic processing.
To facilitate analyzing the convergence properties of the proposed dynamic reinforcement learn-
ing dynamics, we introduce a perturbed version of the decision rule in which strategies are slightly
perturbed. Through this perturbation, we are able to analyze the behavior of the algorithm using
the ODE method for stochastic approximations with a linearized dynamical system. Otherwise,
the analysis involves assessing stability at the boundary of the resulting state space (speciﬁcally,
a vertex of the simplex corresponding to a pure strategy), which can be problematic [22]. These
diﬃculties are removed in this paper. The convergence properties of boundary points can be ana-
lyzed via the ODE method for stochastic approximations since the introduced perturbation in the
decision process of each agent “moves” the stationary points away from the boundary of the state
space.
We illustrate dynamic reinforcement for several classes of coordination games. We will show
that dynamic reinforcement can destabilize a non-eﬃcient equilibrium (in favor of an eﬃcient equi-
librium) even if the original equilibrium is risk-dominant. Accordingly, dynamic reinforcement,
when viewed as a sort of equilibrium selection process, can produce diﬀerent conclusions than pre-
viously analyzed cases. In general, the resulting equilibrium selection under dynamic reinforcement
need not be determined by either payoﬀ or risk dominance or both.
We also illustrate dynamic reinforcement on the problem of equilibrium selection in distributed
network formation, where nodes strategically interact by establishing links with other nodes. We
show how a network formation game can be designed so that certain desirable conﬁgurations are
eﬃcient, while non-eﬃcient equilibria can be destabilized under dynamic reinforcement.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes several examples where
equilibrium selection is of importance. Section 3 introduces a modiﬁed version of standard rein-
forcement learning and goes on to analyze the resulting asymptotic stability properties. Section 4
introduces dynamic reinforcement into the decision process of each agent and analyzes the asymp-
totic stability properties of the modiﬁed algorithm. Sections 4.3 and 5 demonstrate the utility
of dynamic reinforcement for equilibrium selection in several classes of coordination games and
distributed network formation, respectively. Finally, Section 6 presents concluding remarks.
Terminology and notation
We consider games with a ﬁnite population of agents, denoted by I = {1,2,...,n}. Each agent has a
ﬁnite number of actions, denoted by Ai. The total number of actions of agent i (i.e., the cardinality
of Ai) is denoted by |Ai|. Deﬁne A to be the cartesian product of the action spaces of all agents,
4i.e., A , A1 × ... × An. Let αi ∈ Ai denote an action of agent i, and α = (α1,α2,...,αn) ∈ A the
joint action of all agents. The payoﬀ/reward for each agent is a mapping Ri : A → R. Denote by
R : A → Rn the payoﬀ proﬁle of all agents, i.e., R( ) , (R1( ),R2( ),...,Rn( )).
Assumption 1.1 (Strictly positive rewards) For every i ∈ I, the reward function satisﬁes
Ri(α) > 0 for all α ∈ A.
For any integer m > 0, ∆(m) denotes the probability simplex in Rm, i.e.,
∆(m) , {v ∈ Rm : v ≥ 0,1Tv = 1},
where 1 is a vector of ones of appropriate size. The vectors ej,j = 1,2,...,m, denote the vertices
of ∆(m).
For σi ∈ ∆(|Ai|), σij ∈ [0,1] denotes the probability that agent i selects action j ∈ Ai, and σi
is called the (mixed) strategy of agent i. Deﬁne ∆ , ∆(|A1|) × ... × ∆(|An|). A strategy proﬁle is
a combination of strategies of all agents σ = (σ1,σ2,...,σn) ∈ ∆. In case σi = ej, then σi is called
a pure strategy. Likewise, a pure strategy proﬁle is a proﬁle of all pure strategies.
The notation −i denotes the complementary set I\i. We will often split the argument of a
function in this way, e.g., F(α) = F(αi,α−i) or F(σ) = F(σi,σ−i). We will also use the notation
A−i to denote the cartesian product ×s∈−iAs.
Throughout the paper, we deﬁne vi(j,σ) as the expected reward of agent i given that it selects
action αi = j ∈ Ai and every other agent follows strategy σ−i, i.e.,
vi(j,σ) ,
 
α−i∈A−i


 
s∈I\i
σsαs

Ri(j,α−i). (1)
Deﬁnition 1.1 (Nash equilibrium) A strategy proﬁle σ∗ = (σ∗
1,σ∗
2,...,σ∗
n) is a Nash equilibrium
if for each agent i ∈ I,  
j∈Ai
σ∗
ijvi(j,σ∗) ≥
 
j∈Ai
σijvi(j,σ∗) (2)
for all σi ∈ ∆(|Ai|), σi  = σ∗
i.
In the special case where for all i ∈ I, σ∗
i is a pure strategy, then the Nash equilibrium is called
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In case the inequality in (2) is strict, the Nash equilibrium is
called a strict Nash equilibrium.
Some additional notation:
− |x| denotes the Euclidean norm of a vector x ∈ Rn.
5− dist(x,A) denotes the distance from a vector x ∈ Rn to a set A ⊂ Rn, i.e.,
dist(x,A) , inf
y∈A
|x − y|.
− Bδ(x) denotes the δ-neighborhood of a vector x ∈ Rn, i.e.,
Bδ(x) = {y ∈ Rn : |x − y| < δ}.
− Π∆ : Rm → ∆(m) is the projection to the probability simplex, i.e.,
Π∆[x] , arg min
y∈∆(m)
|x − y|.
− row{αi}i∈J denotes the block row vector with entries {αi}i∈J for some set of indices J, i.e.,
row{αi}i∈J ,
 
α1     α|J|
 
where αi ∈ R1×ni for some ni ∈ N, i ∈ J. Likewise, col{ } will denote a column vector.
− diag{Ai}i∈J denotes the block diagonal matrix with diagonal entries {Ai}i∈J for some set of
indices J, i.e.,
diag{Ai}i∈J ,




A1
...
A|J|



,
where Ai ∈ Rni×mi for some ni,mi ∈ N, i ∈ J.
− null{vT} is the null space of the row vector vT ∈ Rn, i.e., null{vT} = {x ∈ Rn : vTx = 0}.
− Int(A) is the interior of a subset A of Rn.
− eig(A) denotes the spectrum of a matrix A.
− Re{ζ} denotes the real part of a complex number ζ ∈ C.
2 Motivating Examples
2.1 Distributed network formation
One topic that has drawn signiﬁcant attention both in social sciences as well as various engineering
settings is distributed network formation. For example, in social sciences one of the questions that
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Figure 1: Nash equilibria in case of the connections model of [42].
arises is how can certain forms of observed social networks be explained? On the other hand, in the
wireless networks literature, one challenge is to design protocols that guarantee an energy eﬃcient
conﬁguration, since a major part of energy is consumed in transmitting signals. The question that
arises is: how can eﬃcient networks be reinforced in a distributed and adaptive fashion?
The problem of network formation can be modeled as a strategic interaction among nodes.
Here nodes can be thought of as decision makers who have discretion over establishing directional
links with other nodes. In a general setting, we may assume that nodes are sources of beneﬁts (or
information) that can be tapped through direct or indirect links, while the establishment of a link
is costly. Individuals may establish as many links as they want, however, they would prefer to have
access to as many agents as possible but with the minimum number of established links.
Such a strategic interaction setup of the network formation problem corresponds to the con-
nections model of [42] and has been used to describe various economic and social contexts such as
the transmission of information. This model has several Nash equilibria. For example, Figure 1
illustrates two networks. Arrows indicate the ﬂow of beneﬁt, and there is a cost to the receiving
node to establish a link. An agent beneﬁts from all other nodes to which it is connected. Both
networks in Figure 1 are Nash equilibria. The ﬁrst network (a) is more eﬃcient in that all nodes
extract full beneﬁt, but with fewer links. In this setup, it will be preferable to be able to guarantee
convergence to network (a). This is an equilibrium selection problem, and it will be addressed in
detail in Section 5.
2.2 Coordination games
Coordination games [43, 44, 9] are situations in which individuals try to achieve uniformity of
action, i.e., doing what others will do. These games model various social scenarios, such as the
establishment of languages or technologies. In coordination games, uniform combinations of actions
are Nash equilibria, and the multiplicity of equilibria is important to the distinctive character of
coordination games.
There are more restrictive classes of coordination problems, depending on the level of coincidence
of interest among individuals. For example, in the game of Table 1(a), there is perfect coincidence
7of interest (pure coordination) [44], while in the game of Table 1(b) there is no perfect coincidence
of interest.
2.A 2.B
1.A 5,5 1,1
1.B 1,1 2,2
(a)
2.A 2.B
1.A 5,5 1,4
1.B 4,1 3,3
(b)
Table 1: (a) The Typewriter game, (b) The Stag-Hunt game
Both coordination games of Table 1 have drawn signiﬁcant attention in that they model various
social phenomena. The Typewriter game models the adoption of new technologies, where it is of
common interest to use a compatible technology even though there might be a better one. The
Stag-Hunt game is a more general game, which can model the adoption or modiﬁcation of the social
contract for mutual beneﬁt [45]. Intuitively, in this setting each individual has two options: (A) to
devote energy to instituting the new social contract, or (B) not. If everyone takes the ﬁrst action,
the social contract equilibrium is achieved (A,A), and if everyone takes the second action, the state
of nature equilibrium results (B,B). But the second course carries less risk than the ﬁrst one.
The amount of risk associated to each of the two equilibria is captured by the average payoﬀ
of any individual when he plays against a uniformly randomizing opponent (cf., [9]). In a game
with symmetric payoﬀ matrices, such as the ones in Table 1, a risk-dominant equilibrium proﬁle
is such that each player maximizes the average payoﬀ against a uniformly randomizing opponent.
For example, in the Stag-Hunt game of Table 1(b), when action B is played against a uniformly
randomizing opponent, it has an average payoﬀ of (4+3)/2 = 7/2. Action A instead has an average
payoﬀ of (5 + 1)/2 = 3 < 7/2. Therefore, (B,B) is the risk-dominant equilibrium.
An important question is how evolutionary processes may lead to either the risk-dominant
equilibrium (B,B) or the payoﬀ-dominant equilibrium (A,A). This problem can be analyzed in
terms of very well studied evolutionary models such as replicator dynamics [46]. In this case, when
replicator dynamics start in the vicinity of the risk-dominant equilibrium (B,B) convergence to the
payoﬀ-dominant equilibrium cannot be achieved. Even when individuals decisions are perturbed
by independent shocks across individuals, as in the best-response with mutations dynamics of [7],
the dynamics spend the majority of the time at the risk-dominant equilibrium (B,B).
In this paper, we will revisit these issues of equilibrium selection for both network formation
and coordination games in the context of the proposed dynamic reinforcement.
3 A Modiﬁed Reinforcement Learning Algorithm
In this section, we formulate and analyze a reinforcement learning algorithm. We will also use the
methods employed in this section to analyze the forthcoming dynamic reinforcement version, while
8contrasting the stability conclusions of the two processes.
3.1 Setup
We will model an agent i ∈ I as a learning automaton. At each time k ∈ {0,1,2,...}, agent i
interacts with the unknown environment (i.e., other agents) by selecting an action, αi(k) ∈ Ai, and
receives a reward, Ri(α(k)), which depends on the actions of all agents, α(k) = (α1(k),...,αn(k)) ∈
A.
The automaton i “learns” via a learning algorithm that is similar to the linear reward-inaction
scheme in reinforcement learning, [47]. This algorithm is written recursively as
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) + ǫ(k)   Ri(α(k))   [eαi(k) − xi(k)], (3)
where xi(k) are the “propensities” of agent i at time k to play diﬀerent actions and eαi(k) denotes
the αi(k)-vertex of the probability simplex ∆(|Ai|). If agent i selects action j at time k, then
αi(k) = ej.
Agent i selects action j at time k with probability
(1 − λ)xij(k) + λ/|Ai|,
and so the strategy of agent i at time k can be deﬁned as σi : ∆(|Ai|) → ∆(|Ai|) where
σi(xi(k)) , (1 − λ)xi(k) + λ
1
|Ai|
1. (4)
Note that with probability λ, agent i makes a (uniformly) random selection (cf., mutations in [7, 8]).
In case λ = 0, then σi(xi(k)) ≡ xi(k).
We assume that the step size sequence satisﬁes
ǫ(k) ,
1
k + 1
. (5)
It is straightforward to show that for suﬃciently large k, the state xi(k) evolves over the probability
simplex ∆(|Ai|). By abuse of terminology, we will also refer to the xi’s as strategies.
This selection of step size is a departure from standard reinforcement learning (e.g., [21]), in
which propensities are proportional to the cumulative reward associated with a particular action.
Nonetheless, it retains the feature of reinforcement learning that propensities increase by virtue of
repeated selection. The relationship is more apparent in the forthcoming ODE analysis, where in
the case λ = 0, the induced ODE is replicator dynamics [22, 23, 26].
93.2 Asymptotic stability analysis
3.2.1 Stochastic approximation: Convergence and nonconvergence
In this section, we recall selected standard results from the ODE method of stochastic approxima-
tions.
Let Ω , ∆∞ denote the canonical path space with an element ω ∈ Ω being a sequence
{x(0),x(1),...}, where x(k) = (x1(k),...,xn(k)) ∈ ∆ is generated by the process. Deﬁne also
the random variable ψk : Ω → ∆ such that ψk(ω) = x(k). In several cases, we will abuse notation
by writing x(k) instead of ψk(ω). Let also F be a σ-algebra of subsets in Ω and P a probability mea-
sure on (Ω,F). Accordingly, E will denote the expectation with respect to the probability measure
P. In the following analysis, we implicitly assume that the σ-algebra F is generated appropriately
to allow computation of the probabilities or expectations of interest.
In order to characterize the stability properties of the stochastic iteration (3), we rewrite it as
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) + ǫ(k)   [gi(x(k)) + ξi(k)], (6)
where the observation sequence has been decomposed into a deterministic sequence, gi(x(k)), and
a noise sequence ξi(k). The deterministic sequence is deﬁned as
gi(x(k)) , ri(x(k)) − Ri(x(k))   xi(k),
where ri(x(k)) , E[Ri(α(k))eαi(k)|x(k)], and Ri(x(k)) , E[Ri(α(k))|x(k)]. It is straightforward to
verify that gi( ) is continuously diﬀerentiable. The noise sequence is deﬁned as
ξi(k) , Ri(α(k))   [eαi(k) − xi(k)] − gi(x(k)).
Here we have employed the Markovian property that
E[Ri(α(k))eαi(k)|x(0),...,x(k)] = E[Ri(α(k))eαi(k)|x(k)],
E[Ri(α(k))|x(0),...,x(k)] = E[Ri(α(k))|x(k)].
Accordingly, E[ξi(k)|x(k)] = 0.
Note that since the reward function Ri( ) of each agent i ∈ I depends on the entire action
proﬁle α(k), the corresponding expected reward function Ri( ) depends on the entire state x(k) ,
(x1(k),...,xn(k)).
The following more compact form of (6) also will be used:
x(k + 1) = x(k) + ǫ(k)   [g(x(k)) + ξ(k)], (7)
10where g( ) , col{gi( )}i∈I and ξ( ) , col{ξi( )}i∈I.
Proposition 3.1 (Convergence) For λ > 0, the stochastic iteration (7) is such that the sequence
{x(k)} converges to an invariant set of the ODE
˙ x = g(x). (8)
Furthermore, let A ⊂ ∆ be a locally asymptotically stable set in the sense of Lyapunov for (8).1
Then P[limk→∞x(k) ∈ A] > 0.
Proof. We ﬁrst recognize that the action proﬁle α(k) and therefore the noise ξ(k) is state-dependent
satisfying E[ξ(k)|x(k)] = 0 and the Markovian property
P[ξ(k + 1) ∈  |ξ(τ),x(τ),τ ≤ k] = P[ξ(k + 1) ∈  |ξ(k),x(k)].
The ﬁrst statement of the proposition follows from Theorem 6.6.1 of [48] since the following condi-
tions are satisﬁed:
− The function g( ) is continuous.
− The sequence Y (k) , g(x(k)) + ξ(k) satisﬁes supk E[|Y (k)|
2] < ∞ since, by Assumption 1.1,
the reward function is positive and bounded from above.
− The step size sequence satisﬁes
 
k ǫ(k)2 < ∞ and
 
k ǫ(k) = ∞.
The second statement of the proposition is due to the randomization in the action selection
that is induced by the mutation rate λ > 0. In particular, for any initial time k0 and initial state
x(k0) = x0 ∈ ∆, we may construct a sequence of action proﬁles such that x(km) lies in the domain
of attraction of any locally asymptotically stable set A, for some ﬁnite m. Such sequence of action
proﬁles has a positive probability to be observed due to λ > 0. It remains to show that the process
may lock-in the domain of attraction of A with a probability that is bounded away from zero. This
holds if k0 is suﬃciently large due to the fact that a) A is a locally asymptotically stable set, which
implies that the solution of the ODE converges to A, and b) the piecewise continuous interpolation
of the process x(k) is arbitrarily close to the solution of the ODE (8) when k0 is suﬃciently large
(see, e.g., [49, Chapter 4]). ￿
The characterization of nonconvergence properties of the stochastic iteration (7) about a sta-
tionary point also is of interest. The stationary points of the ODE (8) are deﬁned by:
S ,
 
x ∈ ∆ : gi(x) = ri(x) − Ri(x)xi = 0,∀i ∈ I
 
. (9)
1If {x(t) : t ≥ 0} denotes the solution of the ODE (8), then a set A ⊂ ∆ is locally asymptotically stable set in the
sense of Lyapunov for the ODE (8) if there exists δ > 0 such that dist(x(0),A) < δ implies limt→∞ x(t) ∈ A.
11Proposition 3.2 (Nonconvergence) For λ > 0, the stochastic iteration (7) is such that, if x∗
is a linearly unstable stationary point of the ODE (8),2 then P[limk→∞ x(k) = x∗] = 0.
Proof. The proposition follows directly from Theorem 1 in [50], since the following conditions are
satisﬁed:
− x∗ is an linearly unstable stationary point of the ODE (8).
− The step-size sequence ǫ(k) = 1
1+k satisﬁes c1
k ≤ ǫ(k) ≤ c2
k for some positive constants c1 and
c2. For example, pick c1 = 1/2 and c2 = 1.
− The noise ξ(k) is uniformly bounded for any k and E[ξ(k)|x(k)] = 0 for any k.
− There exists a constant K > 0, such that for all k and unit vectors ej of appropriate dimension,
we have E[max{0,eT
j ξ(k)}] ≥ K. This condition follows from the randomization induced by
the constant λ > 0.
￿
3.2.2 Characterization of the stationary points
Under Assumption 1.1 of strictly positive rewards, notice that the share of strategy s in agent i
when λ = 0 is evolving according to the vector ﬁeld:
gis(x) =

vi(s,x) −
 
q∈Ai
vi(q,x)xiq

xis,
which coincides with the corresponding shares provided by the replicator dynamics, as pointed out
by [20, Proposition 1]. This form of dynamics can also be thought of as a special class of imitative
dynamics as discussed in [51, Section 5.4]. The following proposition characterizes the stationary
points of the ODE (8) and is a well-known result for replicator dynamics (e.g., see Section 3.3.1 in
[52]).
Proposition 3.3 (Stationary points) For λ = 0, a strategy proﬁle x∗ = (x∗
1,...,x∗
n) is a sta-
tionary point of the ODE (8) if and only if, for every agent i ∈ I, there exists a constant ci > 0,
such that for any action j ∈ Ai, x∗
ij > 0 implies vi(j,x∗) = ci.
Proof. See, e.g., Section 3.3.1 in [52]. ￿
2A stationary point x
∗ of the ODE (8) is linearly unstable if the linear approximation of g near x
∗ has some
eigenvalue with positive real part.
12An immediate consequence of the above proposition is that for λ = 0, any pure strategy proﬁle
is a stationary point of the stochastic iteration.
Proposition 3.4 (Pure Strategies) For λ = 0, any pure strategy proﬁle x∗ = (x∗
1,x∗
2,...,x∗
n) is
a stationary point of the ODE (8).
Proof. See, e.g., Section 3.3.1 in [52]. ￿
Vertices cease to be equilibria for λ > 0. The following proposition provides the sensitivity of
pure strategy equilibria to small values of λ.
Proposition 3.5 (Sensitivity of pure strategies) For any pure strategy proﬁle x∗ which is a
strict Nash equilibrium, and for suﬃciently small λ > 0, there exists a unique continuously diﬀer-
entiable function ν∗ : R+ → R|A|, such that limλ→0 ν∗(λ) = ν∗(0) = 0, and
˜ x(λ) = x∗ + ν∗(λ) ∈ Int(∆) (10)
is a stationary point of the ODE (8). If instead x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, then there exist δ > 0
and λ0 > 0, such that the δ-neighborhood of x∗ in ∆, Bδ(x∗), does not contain any stationary point
of the ODE (8) for any 0 < λ < λ0.
Proof. See Appendix A. ￿
In case x∗ corresponds to a non-strict Nash equilibrium, then existence of stationary points of
the ODE (8) in the vicinity of x∗ is not certain for small λ > 0. This depends on the speciﬁcs of
the payoﬀ function of the game. However, a simple calculation of the vector ﬁeld at any vertex of
∆ can show that a vertex cannot be a stationary point when λ > 0.
Note also that the unperturbed dynamics may exhibit stationary points which are not located
at the vertices of the probability simplex. Proposition 3.5 does not discuss perturbations of such
stationary points. In the remainder of the paper, we will only be concerned about the stability
properties of stationary points which are perturbed versions of pure Nash equilibria (PPE).
3.3 Local asymptotic stability (LAS)
Having characterized the sensitivity of stationary points of the ODE (8) which are located at the
vertices of the probability simplex, we will describe locally the stability properties of PPE.
Proposition 3.6 (LAS - perturbed system) For suﬃciently small λ > 0, let ˜ x = ˜ x(λ) be a
stationary point of the ODE (8), where ˜ xi(λ) = x∗
i + ν∗
i (λ) for all i ∈ I, with x∗
i = ej∗ for some
j∗ = j∗(i) ∈ Ai and ν∗
i deﬁned according to Proposition 3.5. Let vi( ,σ(˜ x)) be the conditional
rewards vector (1) evaluated at ˜ x. Under Assumption 1.1,
13(a) the stationary point ˜ x = ˜ x(λ) is a locally asymptotically stable point of the ODE (8) if, for
each i ∈ I, vi(j∗,σ(˜ x)) > vi(s,σ(˜ x)) for all s ∈ Ai\j∗;
(b) the stationary point ˜ x = ˜ x(λ) is a linearly unstable point of the ODE (8) if there exist i ∈ I
and s ∈ Ai\j∗ such that vi(j∗,σ(˜ x)) < vi(s,σ(˜ x)).
Proof. This proposition will follow directly as a special case of the forthcoming Theorem 4.1. ￿
Proposition 3.7 In the framework of Proposition 3.6, P[limk→∞ x(k) = ˜ x] > 0 if, for each i ∈ I,
vi(j∗,σ(˜ x)) > vi(s,σ(˜ x)) for all s ∈ Ai\j∗ and suﬃciently small λ > 0, i.e., ˜ x corresponds to a strict
Nash equilibrium. Instead, if there exist i ∈ I and s ∈ Ai\j∗ such that vi(j∗,σ(x∗)) < vi(s,σ(x∗))
for λ = 0, i.e., x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, then there exists δ > 0 and λ0 > 0 such that
P[limk→∞ x(k) ∈ Bδ(x∗)] = 0 for any 0 < λ < λ0.
Proof. The ﬁrst statement of the proposition is a direct consequence of Propositions 3.1 and 3.6.
The second statement results from Proposition 3.2 and the fact that: a) there exists δ > 0 and
λ0 > 0 such that Bδ(x∗) does not include any stationary points of the ODE (8) for any 0 < λ < λ0
(as shown by Proposition 3.5); and b) the vector ﬁeld points towards the interior of ∆ (as shown
at the end of the proof of Proposition 3.5). ￿
These propositions address the stability properties of strategies near vertices (i.e., for λ small).
In particular, there is a positive probability of convergence if a strategy corresponds to a pure strict
Nash equilibrium. Likewise, there is zero probability of convergence if there is a strictly superior
alternative. Note that the stability result is the outcome of a linearized analysis of the appropriate
ODE. The introduction of the perturbation λ > 0 allows this analysis, thereby sidestepping issues
associated with analyzing boundary points as in [22].
4 Dynamic Reinforcement
4.1 Running Average Dynamic Reinforcement
Thus far, the action of agent i at time k, αi(k), depends only on the probability distribution xi(k).
We would like to explore the case where the decision of each agent i is also aﬀected by the history
of xi( ) by a dynamic processing of the probability distribution xi( ).
Let us introduce a “control input” ui(k) that also aﬀects the decisions of agent i. In particular,
we now set the strategy of agent i to be:
σi(xi(k),ui(k)) , Π∆[(1 − λ)(xi(k) + ui(k)) + λ
1
|Ai|
1],
14for λ > 0.
In keeping with our desire that the learning algorithms are decentralized, the control input ui(k)
should not make use of the histories of other agents.
One possible dynamic reinforcement scheme (which is akin to “derivative action” in feedback
control) is to make use of the changes in xi(k). A standard controls interpretation is that agents use
these changes to derive predictive myopic forecasts that capture recent trends. A similar approach
was investigated by [41] as an approach to enable stabilization of mixed equilibria in learning in
games. The intention here is diﬀerent. Instead of using dynamic reinforcement to stabilize a mixed
equilibrium, our goal is to investigate the eﬀects on convergence to an eﬃcient pure equilibrium.
In particular, we consider the following speciﬁc form of dynamic reinforcement. For each agent
i ∈ I, we introduce two additional state vectors yi(k) ∈ ∆(|Ai|) and ρi(k) ∈ R+, which are updated
according to the recursions
yi(k + 1) = yi(k) + ǫ(k)   (xi(k) − yi(k)), (11)
ρi(k + 1) = ρi(k) + ǫ(k)   (Ri(α(k)) − ρi(k)), (12)
respectively. In words, for ǫ(k) = 1/(k+1), yi(k) is the running average of the strategy vector xi(k)
and ρi(k) is the running average of the reward Ri(α(k)). Note also that since xi(k) ∈ ∆(|Ai|), then
yi(k) ∈ ∆(|Ai|).
Now let
ui(k) , γi(ρi(k))   (xi(k) − yi(k)) ∈ null{1T},
for a function γi : R+ → R+. This additional control term is reinforcing recent changes as reﬂected
by the current xi(k) and its running average yi(k), scaled by a parameter, γi( ), that may be
constant or, more generally, reward-dependent.
The action vector for each agent i ∈ I is then selected according to the rule σi : ∆(|Ai|) ×
∆(|Ai|) × R+ → [0,1] such that:
σi(xi(k),yi(k),ρi(k)) , Π∆[(1 − λ)(xi(k) + γi(ρi(k))   (xi(k) − yi(k))) + λ
1
|Ai|
1]. (13)
The selection rule (13), in combination with the update recursions of (3), (11) and (12), consti-
tutes a reinforcement scheme which we will call “running average dynamic reinforcement” (RADR).
Furthermore, we will refer to γi( ) as the RADR parameters.
4.2 Asymptotic stability of RADR
The asymptotic stability analysis of RADR will be based on the ODE method for stochastic approx-
imations [48]. These results will follow by applying suitably modiﬁed versions of Propositions 3.1–
153.2.
The dynamic reinforcement scheme has an extended state vector
z(k) ,



x(k)
y(k)
ρ(k)


,
where x(k) = (x1(k),...,xn(k)) is updated by (3), y(k) = (y1(k),...,yn(k)) is updated by (11),
ρ(k) = (ρ1(k),...,ρn(k)) is updated by (12) and the action vector α(k) is selected according to (13).
Its update recursion can be written in a more compact form as follows:
z(k + 1) = z(k) + ǫ(k)  



col{Ri(α(k))   [eαi(k) − xi(k)]}i∈I
x(k) − y(k)
R(α(k)) − ρ(k)


. (14)
Deﬁne also the quantities: Ri(z) , E[Ri(α(k))|z(k) = z], ri(z) , E[Ri(α(k))eαi(k)|z(k) = z]
and gi(z) , ri(z) − Ri(z)xi. Let also R(z) , (R1(z),...,Rn(z)) and g(z) , (g1(z),...,gn(z)).
Then, the update recursion (14) can be written equivalently as:
z(k + 1) = z(k) + ǫ(k)  
 
f(z(k)) + w(k)
 
where the observation sequence has been decomposed into a deterministic sequence, f(z(k)), and
a noise sequence, w(k), deﬁned respectively as:
f(z) ,



g(z)
x − y
R(z) − ρ


, w(k) ,



col{Ri(α(k))   [eαi(k) − xi(k)]}i∈I
x(k) − y(k)
R(α(k)) − ρ(k)


 − f(z).
Note also that E[w(k)|z(k)] = 0. The relevant ODE is now
˙ z = f(z). (15)
It is straightforward to check that the stationary points of the ODE (15) are independent of the
value of γi, i ∈ I. Furthermore, for any given λ > 0, any stationary point of the ODE (15) is of
the form ˜ z(λ) = (˜ x(λ), ˜ y(λ), ˜ ρ(λ)), where g(˜ z(λ)) = 0, ˜ x(λ) = ˜ y(λ) and ˜ ρ(λ) = R(˜ z(λ)). Therefore,
for any given λ > 0, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the sets of stationary points of
the ODE’s (8) and (15).
Our speciﬁc interest is to inspect how the asymptotic stability results of the recursion (3) are
impacted by introducing the dynamic reinforcement term with γi( )  = 0.
Towards this end, we ﬁrst construct the linearized dynamics of the ODE (15) about a stationary
16point ˜ z(λ) = (˜ x(λ), ˜ x(λ), ˜ ρ(λ)). Since the variables x and y evolve on the probability simplex, it
will be convenient to express their evolution in a dimensionally reduced form as follows:
d
dt



δx(t)
δy(t)
δρ(t)


 = ˜ Aλ,γ  



δx(t)
δy(t)
δρ(t)


 (16)
where the perturbation δx(t) = (δx1(t),...,δxn(t)) is such that
xi(t) = ˜ xi(λ) + Nδxi(t), i ∈ I, (17)
for some |Ai| × (|Ai| − 1) orthonormal matrix N which spans the null space of the row vector
1T ∈ R|Ai|, i.e.,
1TN = 0 and NTN = I. (18)
Similarly, δy(t) = (δy1(t),...,δyn(t)), where
yi(t) = ˜ yi(λ) + Nδyi(t), i ∈ I.
Finally, δρ(t) , ρ(t) − ˜ ρ(λ).
The matrix N is introduced to reﬂect that solutions evolve over the probability simplex, and so
have a restricted degree of freedom.
Proposition 4.1 (Linearization of RADR) For suﬃciently small λ > 0, let ˜ z = ˜ z(λ) be a
stationary point of the ODE (15), i.e., ˜ z(λ) = (˜ x(λ), ˜ x(λ), ˜ ρ(λ)), where ˜ xi(λ) = x∗
i + ν∗
i (λ), i ∈ I,
is such that x∗
i = ej∗ for some j∗ = j∗(i) ∈ Ai and ν∗
i deﬁned according to Proposition 3.5. Let
Assumption 1.1 hold. There exist λ-independent matrices A
γ
ii, B
γ
ii, i ∈ I, and matrices Wλ,γ, V λ,γ,
with
lim
λ→0
Wλ,γ = 0, lim
λ→0
V λ,γ = 0,
such that the linearization (16) of the ODE (15) about (˜ x, ˜ x, ˜ ρ) is characterized by3
˜ Aλ,γ =



N O
O N
I I



T 


Aλ,γ Bλ,γ O
I −I O
× × −I






N O
O N
I I


, (19)
3The symbol × corresponds to terms that do not aﬀect the analysis.
17with
Aλ,γ = diag{A
γ
ii}i∈I + Wλ,γ,
Bλ,γ = diag{B
γ
ii}i∈I + V λ,γ,
and N = diag{N,...,N} where N is of appropriate dimension. Furthermore, there exists an |Ai|×
|Ai| unitary matrix Ui such that
A
γ
ii = Ui
 
−vi(j∗,σ(˜ z)) row{−(1 + γi(˜ ρi))vi(s,σ(˜ z))}s =j∗
0 diag{−vi(j∗,σ(˜ z)) + (1 + γi(˜ ρi))vi(s,σ(˜ z))}s =j∗
 
UT
i , (20)
and
B
γ
ii = Ui
 
0 row{γi(˜ ρi)vi(s,σ(˜ z))}s =j∗
0 diag{−γi(˜ ρi)vi(s,σ(˜ z))}s =j∗
 
UT
i . (21)
Proof. See Appendix B. ￿
Based on Proposition 4.1 we can compute the range of values of the RADR parameter γi that
guarantees stability of PPE for suﬃciently small λ > 0.
Theorem 4.1 (LAS of RADR) Assume the hypotheses of Proposition 4.1 and let vi be the con-
ditional rewards vector (1) evaluated at the equilibrium ˜ z = ˜ z(λ) with vi(j∗,σ(˜ z)) > vi(s,σ(˜ z)) for
every i ∈ I and s  = j∗. For suﬃciently small λ > 0,
(a) the stationary point ˜ z = ˜ z(λ) will be a locally asymptotically stable point of the ODE (15) if,
for each agent i ∈ I, the RADR parameter satisﬁes
0 ≤ γi(˜ ρi) <
vi(j∗,σ(˜ z)) + 1
vi(s,σ(˜ z))
− 1, for all s ∈ Ai\j∗. (22)
(b) the stationary point ˜ z = ˜ z(λ) will be a linearly unstable point of the ODE (15) if there exist
i ∈ I and s ∈ Ai\j∗ such that
γi(˜ ρi) >
vi(j∗,σ(˜ z)) + 1
vi(s,σ(˜ z))
− 1 > 0. (23)
Proof. See Appendix C. ￿
Note that Proposition 3.6, which establishes a stability condition when γi = 0, i ∈ I, is a special
case of Proposition 4.1 and Theorem 4.1. In fact, if we set γi = 0 in both (20) and (21), then the
18corresponding stability condition becomes −vi(j∗,σ(˜ z)) + vi(s,σ(˜ z)) < 0. Note also that due to
the fact that γi = 0 for all i ∈ I, the strategy vector σ(˜ z) = σ(˜ x, ˜ x, ˜ ρ) is only a function of ˜ x.
Theorem 4.2 (RADR convergence) Let us consider the RADR reinforcement scheme of (14)
with the action selection rule of (13). In the framework of Theorem 4.1, if the RADR parameters
satisfy (22) for all i ∈ I, then P[limk→∞ x(k) = ˜ x] > 0. Instead, if there exist i ∈ I and s ∈ Ai\j∗
such that γi(˜ ρi) > (vi(j∗,σ(˜ z)) − vi(s,σ(˜ z)) + 1)/vi(s,σ(˜ z)), then P[limk→∞ x(k) = ˜ x] = 0.
Proof. First, note that the statements of Propositions 3.1–3.2 also hold for the RADR reinforce-
ment scheme (14) if we replace ODE (8) with ODE (15). This is due to the fact that the noise
sequence of RADR, w(k), satisﬁes identical properties with the corresponding noise sequence ξ(k)
of the standard reinforcement scheme. In particular, the noise sequence w(k) is uniformly bounded
for any k and has zero mean, i.e., E[w(k)|z(k)] = 0 for any k. Also, due to λ > 0, there ex-
ists a constant K > 0 such that for all k and unit vectors ej of appropriate dimension, we have
E[max{0,eT
j w(k)] ≥ K. Note, ﬁnally, that the corresponding vector ﬁeld of the ODE (15), f( ), is
continuous. Thus, Propositions 3.1–3.2 can be generalized for the RADR reinforcement scheme if
we replace the ODE (8) of standard reinforcement with the ODE (15) of the RADR scheme.
Since condition (22) implies that ˜ z is locally asymptotically stable for the ODE (15), from the
generalization of Proposition 3.1 to the case of RADR, we obtain P[limk→∞ x(k) = ˜ x] > 0. If,
instead, there exist i ∈ I and s ∈ Ai\j∗ such that γi(˜ ρi) > (vi(j∗,σ(˜ z))−vi(s,σ(˜ z))+1)/vi(s,σ(˜ z))
for suﬃciently small λ > 0, then ˜ z is a linearly unstable point of the ODE (15). In this case, from
the generalization of Proposition 3.2 to the case of RADR, we obtain P[limk→∞ x(k) = ˜ x] = 0. ￿
Theorems 4.1–4.2 establish stability and convergence properties of reinforcement learning under
dynamic reinforcement in the vicinity of PPE. As anticipated, these results conform with Proposi-
tions 3.6–3.7 for standard reinforcement learning when γ is small.
Unlike standard reinforcement learning, not all strict Nash equilibria may be stable for larger
values of γ. In fact, some equilibria become destabilized before others as γ is increased. In this way,
RADR may be viewed as an equilibrium selection device. Alternatively, these theorems may be
viewed as addressing robustness of standard reinforcement learning in the presence of heterogeneous
forward looking agents (that employ dynamic reinforcement).
4.3 Equilibrium selection in 2 × 2 coordination games
In this section, we elaborate on the notion of RADR as an equilibrium selection device for 2 × 2
coordination games.
4.3.1 Contrasting Risk and Payoﬀ Dominance
First consider the symmetric coordination game of Table 2.
192.A 2.B
1.A a,a b,c
1.B c,b d,d
Table 2: Symmetric coordination game.
Claim 4.1 Let (A,A) be a payoﬀ dominant equilibrium and (B,B) be risk dominant equilibrium,
i.e.,
a > c, d > b, (a − c) < (d − b), a > d.
There exists a constant γ > 0 such that, if at least one player i applies RADR with γi = γ, then,
for suﬃciently small λ, there is positive probability of convergence to the equilibrium4 (B,B) and
zero probability of convergence to (A,A).
Proof. According to Theorems 4.1–4.2, if at least one player i applies RADR with parameter γi
that satisﬁes:
a − c + 1
c
< γi <
d − b + 1
b
,
then there is positive probability of convergence to the equilibrium (B,B) and zero probability of
convergence to (A,A). Thus, the risk dominant equilibrium maintains stability. This is consistent
with past work on symmetric 2 × 2 games. ￿
Claim 4.2 In the framework of Claim 4.1 and for each player i, there does not exist γ > 0 such
that, if player i applies RADR with γi = γ, then, for suﬃciently small λ, there is positive probability
of convergence to the equilibrium (A,A) and zero probability of convergence to (B,B).
Proof. Either agent i may apply RADR to destabilize (A,A) by
γi >
a − c + 1
c
.
Likewise, either agent i may apply RADR to destabilize (B,B) by
γi >
d − b + 1
b
.
We also have,
a − c + 1
c
<
d − b + 1
c
<
d − b + 1
b
,
where the ﬁrst inequality results from the assumption a−c < d−b and the second inequality results
from the fact that c > b. Thus, destabilizing (A,A) implies destabilizing (B,B). ￿
4actually, the associated λ-perturbed equilibrium. This phrasing will be used throughout Section 4.3.
20The restriction to a constant γ in the above is important, as will be seen in the forthcoming example
in Section 4.3.3.
Claim 4.3 There exist a game with (A,A) both risk dominant and payoﬀ dominant and a constant
γ > 0 such that, if at least one player i applies RADR with γi = γ, then, for suﬃciently small λ,
there is positive probability of convergence to (B,B) and zero probability of convergence to (A,A).
Proof. Set
a = 2 + 2δ, b = 1 − δ, c = 2, d = 1
for some 0 < δ < 1/2. Clearly the equilibrium (A,A) is both payoﬀ and risk dominant. According
to Theorems 4.1–4.2, under RADR with parameter γ, the equilibrium (A,A) is locally stable for
0 ≤ γ <
(2 + 2δ) − 2 + 1
2
=
2δ + 1
2
whereas (B,B) is locally stable for
0 ≤ γ <
1 − (1 − δ) + 1
1 − δ
=
δ + 1
1 − δ
.
Therefore, if at least one player i applies RADR with
2δ + 1
2
< γi <
δ + 1
1 − δ
,
then, for suﬃciently small λ, there is positive probability of convergence to (B,B) and zero prob-
ability of convergence to (A,A). ￿
4.3.2 Strategic advantage
Let us consider the more general payoﬀ matrix of Table 3.
2.A 2.B
1.A a1,a2 b,c
1.B c,b d1,d2
Table 3: Asymmetric coordination game.
Assume a Battle of the Sexes payoﬀ structure, i.e.,
a1 > a2 > 0, d1 = a2, d2 = a1, b = c > 0, a1 > c, and d1 > b.
The equilibrium (A,A) is more desirable for agent 1, whereas (B,B) is more desirable for agent 2.
21Claim 4.4 If agent 1 employs RADR with
d1 − b + 1
b
< γ1 <
a1 − c + 1
c
,
while agent 2 does not employ RADR (i.e., γ2 = 0), then, for suﬃciently small λ, there is positive
probability of convergence to (A,A) and zero probability of convergence to (B,B).
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Theorems 4.1–4.2. ￿
This example illustrates how there can be an evolutionary strategic advantage to an agent
implementing RADR. The agent that applies RADR destabilizes the less desirable equilibrium in
favor of the desirable one.
4.3.3 Payoﬀ dependent γ
We established in Section 4.3.1 that an equilibrium that is risk-dominant but not payoﬀ-dominant
cannot be destabilized under RADR with parameter γ. We now illustrate that this conclusion can
be reversed through payoﬀ dependent RADR parameters, γi( ).
Claim 4.5 In the setting of Claim 4.1, there exists payoﬀ-dependent γ( ) such that, if at least one
player i applies RADR with γi = γ( ), then, for suﬃciently small λ, there is positive probability of
convergence to the payoﬀ dominant equilibrium (A,A) and zero probability of convergence to the
risk dominant (B,B).
Proof. Set
γi(ρi) ,
γo
ρκ
i
, (24)
where γo > 0 and κ > 1 are constants. Such a parameter is large when ρi is small, and vice versa.
Since RADR can be thought of as a way of exploiting more rewarding actions (according to recent
trends), it is natural to consider a smaller γ, thereby reducing its eﬀect, when the running average
payoﬀ is large, and vice versa.
Now let either agent implement RADR with
κ >
log
 
a−c+1
d−b+1   b
c
 
log
 d
a
  > 0 (25)
and
dκd − b + 1
b
< γo < aκa − c + 1
c
, (26)
22Then according to Theorems 4.1–4.2, there is positive probability of convergence to (A,A) and zero
probability of convergence to (B,B), i.e., the risk dominant equilibrium is no longer stable in favor
of the payoﬀ dominant equilibrium. ￿
Fig. 2(a) shows the solution of the ODE (15) when a = 5, b = 1, c = 4 and d = 3. Player 1
applies RADR according to (24). According to the previous discussion, when κ > 3.51 there exists
γo for which the stochastic process does not converge to (B,B). For example, if κ = 5, then for
any 729 < γo < 1562, the equilibrium proﬁle (B,B) is unstable, while (A,A) is stable.
For an initial condition that is very close to the non-eﬃcient equilibrium (B,B), Fig. 2(a) shows
that the solution still escapes the non-eﬃcient equilibrium, and convergences to (A,A). Fig. 2(b)
shows a typical response of the stochastic iteration (7) under the RADR framework, which illustrates
that the process does not converge to the non-eﬃcient equilibrium.
These simulations also illustrate that the region of attraction of the stable equilibrium may
not be restricted to local stability. However, the present analysis only considers local stability.
Characterizing the actual region of attraction remains an open question.
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Figure 2: (a) The solution of ODE (15) with initial conditions x1(0) = x2(0) = y1(0) = (0,1), when
the reward function is deﬁned by Table 2 for a = 5, b = 1, c = 4 and d = 3, and player 1 applies
approximate derivative action (13) with λ = 0.01 and γ1 deﬁned by (24) with γo = 1000 and κ = 5.
(b) A typical response of the stochastic iteration (7) under the same conditions.
4.3.4 Discussion
The previous claims characterize how the local stability properties of PPE, in 2 × 2 coordination
games, might change when either one of the players employ RADR. In several cases, the parameters
23of RADR can appropriately be tailored to make a desirable pure Nash equilibrium the unique
locally asymptotically stable PPE. We concluded that RADR may provide a justiﬁcation for the
emergence of pure Nash equilibria which cannot be “selected” under diﬀerent learning dynamics,
such as replicator dynamics. For example, in the case of the Stag-Hunt game of Section 4.3.3,
by selecting appropriately the RADR parameters, the risk-dominant PPE might become linearly
unstable while the payoﬀ-dominant is still locally asymptotically stable, therefore justifying the
emergence of the payoﬀ-dominant PPE.
It is also worth mentioning that the above analysis does not provide a complete characterization
of the behavior of RADR in 2×2 coordination games, which depends very closely on the selection
of its parameters. For example, for large values of γ, all PPE might be linearly unstable, in which
case diﬀerent phenomena might emerge, such as periodic orbits. The increased dimension of the
relevant ODE under RADR does not allow for an accurate prediction of the behavior of RADR
for the whole range of its parameters. Assessing the potential attractors of the learning dynamics
under all possible scenarios goes beyond the scope of this paper and it remains an open question.
5 Equilibrium selection in distributed network formation
In this section, we continue the theme of dynamic reinforcement and equilibrium selection for the
special problem of distributed network formation. In particular, we show how RADR can lead to
eﬃcient network formations. The dynamics are distributed in the sense that no agent has a global
view of the network. Accordingly, in contrast to prior work on network formation, agents cannot
implement best or better reply dynamics.
5.1 One-way beneﬁt ﬂow model
We will consider a one-way (directed) ﬂow model, where a network G is deﬁned as a collection of
pairwise directed links, (s,i), s,i ∈ I. More precisely, G ⊆ {(s,i) : s,i ∈ I}. For example, the
network G = {(2,1),(1,3),(3,2)} is illustrated in Fig. 1(a), where a link (s,i) starts at i with the
arrowhead pointing at s.
Deﬁne a path from s to i in G, as (s → i) =
 m−1
k=0 (sk,sk+1) for some positive integer, m, where
{sk}m
k=0 is a sequence in I that satisﬁes s0 = s, sm = i, sk  = sk+1 and (sk,sk+1) ∈ G for any
k = 0,1,...,m − 1.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Connectivity) A node i ∈ I is connected to a node s ∈ I\i if there is a path
from s to i. A network is connected if any i ∈ I is connected to any s ∈ I\i.
The orientation of a link denotes the direction of “ﬂow of beneﬁts” or “information ﬂow”. This
model corresponds to the one-way ﬂow network model of [11, 10].
24For the remainder of this section, we assume that each agent is able to establish a link with
any other agent in I\i, i.e., there is no neighborhood structure over the set of feasible links.
5.2 Network formation
We consider the problem of distributed network formation as introduced in Section 2.1. We assume
that the action set Ai for each agent includes all the possible combinations of neighboring nodes
(equivalently, links), i.e., Ai , 2I\i. The empty set, which is part of Ai, will correspond to
establishing no links.
For example, in the case of n = 3 agents of network Fig. 1(a), the set of actions of agent 1
will be A1 = {{1},{2},{3},{2,3}}, where for example, action {1} implies that agent 1 does not
establish any link, and action {2,3} implies that agent 1 creates a link with both agents 2 and 3.
Similarly to the previous analysis, we deﬁne an enumeration {1,2,...,|Ai|} of the actions in Ai.
We assume that agents update their propensities to establish diﬀerent links using the learning
algorithm (3). Also, each agent selects links according to the enhanced decision rule (13).
We deﬁne the beneﬁts of agent i, Ri( ), to be equal to the number of nodes that are accessible
to i through direct and indirect connections following the orientation of the graph minus the cost
of the established links. More precisely, let Gα denote the network induced by the action proﬁle α.
Deﬁne
χα(s → i) =



1, Gα contains the path (s → i);
0 otherwise
Then
Ri(α) =
 
s∈I\i
χα(s → i) − κ0 |αi|. (27)
For the remainder of this section, we assume that 0 < κ0 < 1, which assures that agents always
have the incentive to form at least one link.
5.3 Nash networks
A Nash network is deﬁned accordingly to the Deﬁnition 1.1 of a Nash equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 5.2 (Nash network) An action proﬁle α∗ ∈ A is a Nash network if and only if
Ri(α∗
i,α∗
−i) ≥ Ri(α′
i,α∗
−i), (28)
for all α′
i ∈ Ai\α∗
i and i ∈ I. Likewise, a strict Nash network satisﬁes the strict inequality in (28).
Claim 5.1 Nash networks are connected.
25Proof. Assume that a Nash network, say G, is not connected. Then, there exist i,j ∈ I such that
j ∈ Ni and (j → i) / ∈ G. Adding (j,i) to G increases the reward of agent i, since 1 > κ0, and
therefore it increases the reward of agent i. Thus, the network G is not a Nash network, which
contradicts our initial assumption. Thus, any Nash network is a connected network. ￿
We can also characterize the set of strict Nash networks. First, deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 5.3 (Wheel network) A wheel network is a connected network uniquely deﬁned by a
path (i → i) for some i ∈ I where every agent in I is visited only once.
Claim 5.2 The wheel network is the unique strict Nash network.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that the wheel network is a strict Nash network. Let us
consider any other (necessarily connected) Nash network, G. If it is not a wheel network, there
exists an agent that is a common link between two other agents, i.e., (i,j),(i,k) ∈ G for some
i,j,k ∈ I. This cannot be a strict Nash network, since agent j is indiﬀerent between connecting to
i or connecting to k. ￿
Note that at the wheel network every agent realizes its maximum possible utility. We will also
refer to this network as the eﬃcient network.
5.4 Eﬃcient network formation
Assume that every agent applies RADR, i.e., the update recursion of (3) with the enhanced selection
rule of (13). Let xeﬀ be the stationary point of the ODE (15) which corresponds to the eﬃcient
(strict) Nash network according to (10) for suﬃciently small λ > 0. Since any other (non-eﬃcient)
Nash network is not strict, as Proposition 3.5 indicates, it is not certain whether for suﬃciently
small λ > 0 there exists a stationary point of the ODE (15) in the vicinity of a non-eﬃcient Nash
network. Let xnon corresponds to such a stationary point, if it exists. It will be shown that when
every agent i selects γi within a given interval, then the non-eﬃcient networks are linearly unstable
points of the ODE (15).
Claim 5.3 (Destabilization of non-eﬃcient Nash networks) Let xnon be a stationary point
of ODE (15) in the vicinity of a non-eﬃcient Nash network, αnon, for suﬃciently small λ > 0.
There exists an agent i and a constant γnon > 0 such that if agent i applies the RADR scheme of
(13) with parameter γi > γnon, then the non-eﬃcient equilibrium, xnon, is a linearly unstable point
for (15).
Proof. For any non-eﬃcient Nash network (in this case, anything other than the wheel network)
by following the proof of Claim 5.2, we can identify an agent i that would be indiﬀerent between its
26current action, αnon
i , and an alternative, α′
i. We will use Theorem 4.2 to compute a destabilizing
level of γi for this agent. For this agent, vi(αnon
i ,σ(xnon)) = (n−1)−κ0 +O(λ). If agent i deviates
to α′
i, its expected utility becomes vi(α′
i,σ(xnon)) = (n − 1) − κ0 + O(λ). Applying Theorem 4.2
and setting
γnon ,
vi(αnon
i ,σ(xnon)) − vi(α′
i,σ(xnon)) + 1
vi(α′
i,σ(xnon))
gives the desired result. ￿
Claim 5.4 (Stabilization of eﬃcient Nash network) Let xeﬀ be a stationary point correspond-
ing to the wheel network, αeﬀ, according to (10) for suﬃciently small λ > 0. There exists a
γeﬀ > γnon such that if any agent i applies the dynamic reinforcement scheme of (13) with coeﬃ-
cient γi, 0 < γi < γeﬀ, then xeﬀ is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium for (15).
Proof. Again, we will use Theorem 4.2 to compute an upper bound for γeﬀ. Assume that agents are
currently playing the eﬃcient equilibrium conﬁguration with associated propensities xeﬀ. Consider
any agent i ∈ I, who is currently playing the corresponding equilibrium action αeﬀ
i . Agent i realizes
utility vi(αeﬀ
i ,σ(xeﬀ)) = (n − 1) − κ0 + O(λ), since the network is connected (by Proposition 5.1)
and each agent maintains only one link.
Assume now that agent i deviates by selecting a diﬀerent action α′
i  = α∗
i, such that vi(α′
i,σ(xeﬀ))
is as large as possible. This deviation corresponds to the tightest upper bound in Theorem 4.2.
Since 1 > κ0, the desired action α′
i corresponds to the case of establishing two links, one of which
is the link of αeﬀ
i and the other link is arbitrary. In this case, vi(α′
i,σ(xeﬀ)) = (n−1)−2κ0+O(λ),
and by Theorem 4.2, for any γi > 0 such that
γi <
vi(αeﬀ
i ,σ(xeﬀ)) − vi(α′
i,σ(xeﬀ)) + 1
vi(α′
i,σ(xeﬀ))
, γeﬀ,
the eﬃcient equilibrium xeﬀ is locally asymptotically stable for (15). Since
1 + κ0
(n − 1) − 2κ0
>
1
(n − 1) − κ0
,
we also conclude that γeﬀ > γnon for small λ. ￿
Combining the previous two claims leads to the conclusion that the only stable equilibrium
under RADR is the eﬃcient wheel network.
Proposition 5.1 In the framework of Claims 5.3–5.4, if γi ∈ (γnon,γeﬀ) for all i ∈ I, then
P[limk→∞ x(k) = xeﬀ] > 0, and P[limk→∞ x(k) = xnon] = 0.
275.5 Simulations
Consider a network of n = 3 agents. Given the deﬁnition of the reward function (27), the network
formation game exhibits multiple Nash equilibria, namely the wheel and star network of Fig. 1. As
shown by Claim 5.2, the wheel network is the unique strict Nash network, while the star network
is a non-strict Nash network (i.e., the linearized ODE about this equilibrium exhibits some zero
eigenvalues).
According to Proposition 3.1, convergence to the star network is not excluded when γi =
0 for all i ∈ I. Fig. 3(a) shows a typical response of this case, where convergence to a star
network of Fig. 1(b) is attained. In these simulations, we denote the action set of each agent i
by Ai = {A,B,C,D}, where A1 = {{1},{2},{3},{2,3}}, A2 = {{2},{1},{3},{1,3}} and A3 =
{{3},{1},{2},{1,2}}.
According to Claims 5.3–5.4, we know that for suﬃciently small λ > 0 and κ0 = 1/2, if
γi ∈ (2/3,3/2), then any non-eﬃcient Nash network is unstable, while the eﬃcient one is still
locally stable. In Fig. 3(b) we have simulated the stochastic recursion (3) with initial conditions
that are close to the non-eﬃcient network of Fig. 1(b) when all agents apply dynamic reinforcement
(13) with γ = 1. We observe that deviation from the non-eﬃcient (star) network is achieved and
the process converges to the eﬃcient (wheel) network.
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Figure 3: Typical response of RADR (3), for κ0 = 1/2, λ = 0.01 and (a) random initial propensities
and γi = 0 for all i ∈ I, (b) initial propensities close to the star network and γi = 1 for all i ∈ I.
6 Conclusions
We considered the problem of distributed convergence to eﬃcient outcomes where agents have
access only to their own prior actions and received rewards. We showed that convergence to an
28eﬃcient coordination structure can be reinforced by dynamic processing of only local information.
This illustrates how even unilateral dynamics can aﬀect the aggregate outcome of an evolutionary
process.
We used a simple form of dynamic processing, speciﬁcally RADR, which reinforces recent
changes of the state from its running average. We showed that each agent by applying this dy-
namic reinforcement scheme is able to destabilize non-eﬃcient equilibria by appropriately adjusting
the RADR coeﬃcient. We specialized our results in coordination games, where risk- and payoﬀ-
dominant equilibria might not coincide, and we showed that destabilization of the non-eﬃcient or
risk-dominant equilibrium is possible. We also illustrated the utility of such reinforcement scheme
in a network formation process.
A particularly interesting future direction is to consider more general forms of dynamic pro-
cessing. However, it is unclear what types of dynamic processing would be considered “reasonable”
models of interactions. This consideration strongly depends on the underlying context, e.g., as a
prescriptive model for engineered systems, or a descriptive model of social systems.
A Proof of Proposition 3.5
For any agent i ∈ I and any action s ∈ Ai, the corresponding entry of the vector ﬁeld is
gis(˜ x) = vi(s,σ(˜ x))[(1 − λ)˜ xis + λ/|Ai|] −
 
q∈Ai
vi(q,σ(˜ x))[(1 − λ)˜ xiq + λ/|Ai|]˜ xis. (29)
Consider any pure strategy proﬁle x∗, and take ˜ x = x∗ + ν, for some ν = (ν1,ν2,...,νn) ∈
×i∈IR|Ai| such that νi ∈ null{1T} and ˜ xi = x∗
i + νi ∈ ∆(|Ai|) for all i ∈ I. Substituting ˜ x into
(29), yields
gis(ν,λ) = vi(s,σ(˜ x))[(1 − λ)(x∗
is + νis) + λ/|Ai|]
−
 
q∈Ai
vi(q,σ(˜ x))
 
(1 − λ)(x∗
iq + νiq) + λ/|Ai|
 
(x∗
is + νis).
Note that gis(0,0) = 0, since x∗ is a stationary point of the unperturbed dynamics. Moreover,
the partial derivatives of gis evaluated at (0,0) are:
∂gis(ν,λ)
∂νis
   
 
 
(0,0)
= vi(s,x∗)(1 − x∗
is) −
 
q∈Ai
vi(q,x∗)x∗
iq,
∂gis(ν,λ)
∂νiq
 
   
 
(0,0)
= −vi(q,x∗)x∗
is, for all q ∈ Ai\s.
29Note also that for any ℓ ∈ I\i and m ∈ Aℓ, we have
∂gis(ν,λ)
∂νℓm
 
   
 
(0,0)
=
∂vi(s,σ(˜ x))
∂νℓm
 
   
 
(0,0)
x∗
is −
 
q∈Ai
∂vi(q,σ(˜ x))
∂νℓm
 
   
 
(0,0)
x∗
iqx∗
is.
Since x∗ corresponds to a pure strategy state, for each i ∈ I there exists j∗ = j∗(i) such that
x∗
i = ej∗, i.e., xij∗ = 1 and x∗
is = 0 for all s  = j∗. For this pure strategy state and for any s ∈ Ai\j∗
we have
∂gis(ν,λ)
∂νis
 
   
 
(0,0)
= vi(s,x∗) − vi(j∗,x∗),
and
∂gis(ν,λ)
∂νiq
 
   
 
(0,0)
= 0 ∀q ∈ Ai\s,
∂gis(ν,λ)
∂νℓm
 
   
 
(0,0)
= 0 ∀ℓ ∈ I\i,m ∈ Aℓ.
Given that νi ∈ null{1T} and ∂gis(ν,λ)/∂νij∗ = 0 for all s  = j∗, the behavior of g( , ) with
respect to ν about the point (0,0) is described by the following Jacobian matrix:
∇νg(ν,λ)|(0,0) =




diag{v1(s,x∗) − v1(j∗,x∗)}s =j∗ 0
...
0 diag{vn(s,x∗) − vn(j∗,x∗)}s =j∗



.
The above Jacobian matrix has full rank if for each i ∈ I
vi(s,x∗) − vi(j∗,x∗)  = 0 for all s  = j∗.
In this case, by the implicit function theorem, there exists a neighborhood D of λ = 0 and a unique
diﬀerentiable function ν∗ : D → R|A| such that ν∗(0) = 0 and g(ν∗(λ),λ) = 0, for any λ ∈ D.
Note also that
∇λg(ν,λ)|(0,0) =

 

col{v1(s,x∗)/|A1|}s =j∗
. . .
col{vn(s,x∗)/|An|}s =j∗

 
.
Again, by implicit function theorem, we have that
∇λν∗(λ)|λ=0 = −(∇νg(ν,λ)|(0,0))−1   ∇λg(ν,λ)|(0,0)
which implies that for any i ∈ I and for any s  = j∗
dν∗
is(λ)
dλ
 
   
 
λ=0
= −
vi(s,x∗)
|Ai|(vi(s,x∗) − vi(j∗,x∗))
.
30Since ν∗
is(0) = 0 and x∗
is = 0, in order for the solution ˜ x = x∗ + ν∗(λ) to be in Int(∆), we
also need the condition dν∗
is(λ)/dλ|λ=0 > 0 to be satisﬁed for all s  = j∗. Since vi(s,x∗) > 0 by
Assumption 1.1, this condition is equivalent to
vi(s,x∗) − vi(j∗,x∗) < 0
for all i ∈ I and any s  = j∗. This is also equivalent to x∗ being a strict Nash equilibrium. Thus,
the conclusion follows.
If x∗ corresponds to an action proﬁle which is not a Nash equilibrium, then there exists i ∈ I
and s  = j∗ such that vi(s,x∗) − vi(j∗,x∗) > 0. In this case, the implicit function theorem applies
but the vector ˜ x = x∗ + ν∗(λ) is not in ∆. Furthermore, for any suﬃciently small δ > 0, consider
the δ-neighborhood of x∗ in ∆, Bδ(x∗), i.e., consider 0 ≤ xis < δ for all s  = j∗. If ˜ x denotes the
perturbed state, the corresponding value of the vector ﬁeld is
gis(˜ x) ≈ [vi(s,σ(˜ x)) − vi(j∗,σ(˜ x))]δ + vi(s,σ(˜ x))λ/|Ai| (30)
plus higher order terms of λ and δ. Since the Nash condition is violated in the direction of s,
vi(s,σ(˜ x)) − vi(j,σ(˜ x)) = c + O(δ),
for some c > 0, where O(δ) denotes a quantity of order of δ. Furthermore, by Assumption 1.1 of
strictly positive rewards, vi(s,σ(˜ x)) > 0 for all s ∈ Ai and ˜ x ∈ ∆. Therefore, gis(˜ x) > 0 for any
˜ x ∈ Bδ(x∗) and for suﬃciently small λ > 0.
B Proof of Proposition 4.1
We ﬁrst linearize the ﬁrst part of the vector ﬁeld, g(x,y,ρ). The partial derivatives of g with respect
to x are captured by the matrix Aλ,γ. It is straightforward to show that the non-diagonal blocks of
Aλ,γ approach zero as λ → 0. In particular, the change of the vector ﬁeld of agent i ∈ I, gi( , , ),
when agent l ∈ I\i perturbs his strategy is captured by
A
λ,γ
il δxl = lim
h→0
gi(˜ xl + hδxl, ˜ x−l, ˜ y, ˜ ρ)
h
,
where we write the perturbed strategy proﬁle as (˜ xl + hδxl, ˜ x−l, ˜ y, ˜ ρ) for some arbitrarily small
h > 0, since only the state of agent l is perturbed. For convenience, we will use the notation
∆xl , (˜ xl + hδxl, ˜ x−l, ˜ y, ˜ ρ). Note also that the vector δxl ∈ R|Al| determines the direction of the
perturbation, and assume for now that ˜ xl + hδxl ∈ ∆(|Al|).
31The sth entry of the expected reward vector of agent i at ∆xl is
ris(∆xl) = [(1 − λ)˜ xis + λ/|Ai|]   vi(s,σ(∆xl)).
Note that
vi(s,∆xl) = vi(s,σ(˜ z)) + h(1 + γl)(1 − λ)
 
q∈Ai
δxlq   vi(s,σ(˜ z)|αl = q), (31)
where vi(s,σ(˜ z)|αl = q) denotes the conditional reward (1) evaluated at the equilibrium ˜ z = (˜ x, ˜ y, ˜ ρ)
given also that agent l selects action q.
The expected component sum of the reward vector is
Ri(∆xl) =
 
s∈Ai
ris(∆xl),
which implies that the sth entry of the vector ﬁeld of agent i at ∆xl will be
gis(∆xl) = ris(∆xl) − Ri(∆xl)   ˜ xis.
If we replace the expected reward terms in (31), divide by h, and take the limit as h → 0, we take
a quantity that is factored by λ, so that
A
λ,γ
il = W
λ,γ
il , l ∈ I\i,
for some matrix W
λ,γ
il which satisﬁes limλ→0 W
λ,γ
il = 0.
We now compute the diagonal blocks of A
λ,γ
ii , i ∈ I, which satisfy
A
λ,γ
ii δxi = lim
h→0
gi(˜ xi + hδxi, ˜ x−i, ˜ y, ˜ ρ)
h
,
where the perturbed strategy proﬁle is (˜ xi + hδxi, ˜ x−i, ˜ y, ˜ ρ) for some arbitrarily small h > 0,
since only the state of agent i is perturbed. Again, for convenience, we will use the notation
∆xi , (˜ xi + hδxi, ˜ x−i, ˜ y, ˜ ρ). In this case, the expected reward of agent i is
ris(∆xi) = [(1 − λ)(˜ xis + (1 + γi)hδxis) + λ/|Ai|]   vi(s,σ(˜ z)),
for all s ∈ Ai. Also, the component sum of the expected reward vector is Ri(∆xi) =
 
s∈Ai ris(∆xi).
The corresponding entries of the vector ﬁeld will be
gij∗(∆xi) = −[1 + (1 + γi)hδxij∗]vi(j∗,σ(˜ z))hδxij∗
32−
 
q∈Ai\j∗
(1 + γi)hδxiqvi(q,σ(˜ z))(1 + hδxij∗) + ×,
and, for any s ∈ Ai\j∗,
gis(∆xi) = [−vi(j∗,σ(˜ z)) + (1 + γ)vi(s,σ(˜ z))]hδxis
−
 
q∈Ai
(1 + γi)hδxiqvi(q,σ(˜ z))hδxis + ×,
where × denotes quantities that are factored by terms of the form hδxis, s ∈ Ai, and approach
zero as λ → 0.
If we divide by h and take the limit as h → 0, we conclude that the Jacobian matrix A
λ,γ
ii can
be written as
A
λ,γ
ii = A
γ
ii + W
λ,γ
ii ,
where W
λ,γ
ii is a matrix whose entries are bounded and satisﬁes limλ→0 W
λ,γ
ii = 0. Also,
A
γ
ii = Ui
 
−vi(j∗,σ(˜ z)) row{−(1 + γi)vi(s,σ(˜ z))}s =j∗
0 diag{−vi(j∗, ˜ z) + (1 + γi)vi(s,σ(˜ z))}s =j∗
 
UT
i
for some unitary matrix Ui in R|Ai|×|Ai| which rearranges the sequence of states so that action j∗
corresponds to the ﬁrst row.
Regarding the evaluation of matrix Bλ,γ, it is straightforward to show that its non-diagonal
blocks approach zero as λ → 0. Its diagonal blocks, B
λ,γ
ii , are deﬁned by
B
λ,γ
ii δyi = lim
h→0
gi(˜ x, ˜ yi + hδyi, ˜ y−i, ˜ ρ)
h
,
where the perturbed strategy proﬁle is (˜ x, ˜ yi + hδyi, ˜ y−i, ˜ ρ), which will be denoted by ∆yi. In this
case, the sth entry of the expected reward function is given by
ris(∆yi) = [(1 − λ)(˜ xis − γihδyis) + λ/|Ai|]   vi(s,σ(˜ z)).
We conclude that the Jacobian matrix B
λ,γ
ii can be written in the following form:
B
λ,γ
ii = B
γ
ii + V
λ,γ
ii ,
where V
λ,γ
ii is a matrix whose entries are bounded and satisﬁes limλ→0 V
λ,γ
ii = 0. Also,
B
γ
ii = Ui
 
0 row{γivi(s,σ(˜ z))}s =j∗
0 diag{−γivi(s,σ(˜ z))}s =j∗
 
UT
i .
33As far as the partial derivatives of g with respect to ρ are concerned, it is straightforward to
show that they are zero. In particular, any perturbation of ρ about an equilibrium point (˜ x, ˜ y, ˜ ρ)
perturbs only the feedback gain γi( ). However, the feedback gain multiplies x − y, which at an
equilibrium is identically zero, and therefore any perturbation of ρ does not perturb g.
The second part of the vector ﬁeld, x−y, is linear and the computation of the partial derivatives
is straightforward. It is also straightforward to show that partial derivative of the last part of the
vector ﬁeld R(z) − ρ with respect to ρ is simply −I.
So far, we have not taken into account that the perturbations δxi and δyi belong to the invariant
subspace of the unit vector. Consider an orthonormal matrix N as deﬁned by (17) and (18). Then,
the linearization (16) has the system matrix of (19).
C Proof of Theorem 4.1
By Theorem 3.7 in [53], a stationary point of the ODE (15) is a locally asymptotically stable point
if and only if Re{ζi} < 0, for all ζi ∈ eig( ˜ Aλ,γ).
According to the deﬁnition of the linearization (16), the perturbed state vector δxi of each agent
i ∈ I satisﬁes
xi − ˜ xi = Nδxi ∈ null{1T},
which implies that
xij∗ − ˜ xij∗ = −1Tcol{xis − ˜ xis}s =j∗.
Similarly, we have
yij∗ − ˜ yij∗ = −1Tcol{yis − ˜ yis}s =j∗.
The linearized dynamics (16) of agent i about ˜ z = (˜ x, ˜ x, ˜ ρ) can be described by the reduced
state vector
δˆ z = (δˆ x,δˆ y,δρ) , (col{δˆ xi}i∈I,col{δˆ yi}i∈I,col{δρi}i∈I)
where δˆ xi , col{xi(s) − ˜ xi(s)}s =j∗ and δˆ yi , col{yi(s) − ˜ yi(s)}s =j∗. Therefore, according to
Proposition 4.1, the evolution of the reduced state vector δˆ zi takes on the form
d
dt
δˆ zi = ˜ Aλ,γδˆ zi ,



ˆ Aλ,γ ˆ Bλ,γ O
I −I O
× × −1


δˆ zi
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ˆ Aλ,γ = diag
 
ˆ A
γ
ii
 
i∈I
+ ˆ Wλ,γ,
ˆ Bλ,γ = diag
 
ˆ B
γ
ii
 
i∈I
+ ˆ V λ,γ,
where
ˆ A
γ
ii , diag{−vi(j∗,σ(˜ z)) + (1 + γi(˜ ρi))vi(s,σ(˜ z))}s =j∗, i ∈ I
ˆ B
γ
ii = diag{−γi(˜ ρi)vi(s,σ(˜ z))}s =j∗, i ∈ I
and ˆ Wλ,γ, ˆ V λ,γ are matrices such that
lim
λ→0
ˆ Wλ,γ = 0, lim
λ→0
ˆ V λ,γ = 0.
Therefore, the spectrum of the linearization matrix ˜ Aλ,γ, when λ = 0, is given by
eig( ˜ A0,γ) =
 
i∈I
eig
 
ˆ A
γ
ii B
γ
ii
I −I
 
∪ {−1}.
Deﬁne the quantities
αis , −vi(j∗,σ(˜ z)) + (1 + γi(˜ ρi))   vi(s,σ(˜ z)),
and
βis , −γi(˜ ρi)   vi(s,σ(˜ z)),
for any s  = j∗. It is straightforward to check that there exists unitary matrix Qi, which rearranges
the sequence of the states, such that
Qi
 
ˆ A
γ
ii B
γ
ii
I −I
 
QT
i = diag
  
αis βis
1 −1
  
s =j∗
.
Thus, we conclude that the spectrum of the linearization matrix ˜ Aλ,γ, when λ = 0, is given by
eig( ˜ A0,γ) =
 
i∈I
 
s∈Ai\j∗
eig
 
αis βis
1 −1
 
∪ {−1}.
35Finally, note that
eig
 
αis βis
1 −1
 
=
 
ζ ∈ C : ζ2 + (1 − αis)ζ − (αis + βis) = 0
 
, Eis.
Since at the equilibrium ˜ z = (˜ x, ˜ x, ˜ ρ) and for suﬃciently small λ > 0 we have vi(j∗,σ(˜ z)) >
vi(s,σ(˜ x)) for every i ∈ I and s ∈ Ai\j∗, then
αis + βis = −vi(j∗,σ(˜ z)) + vi(s,σ(˜ z)) < 0.
By the Routh-Hurwitz stability criterion (cf. [54]), the real part of any eigenvalue ζ ∈ Eis satisﬁes:
Re{ζ} < 0 ⇔ 1 − αis > 0 ∀s  = j∗.
Hence, for suﬃciently small λ > 0, the stationary point ˜ z is a locally asymptotically stable
point of the ODE (15) if condition (22) holds. If, instead, there exist i ∈ I and s  = j∗ such that
condition (23) holds, then the stationary point ˜ z is a linearly unstable point of the ODE (15).
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